Regulation is essential to health systems and is central to advancing equity-oriented policy objectives in health. Regulating new medical specialties is an emerging, yet underexplored, aspect of health sector governance in low-and middle-income countries (LMICs), such as India. Limited research exists regarding how regulatory institutions in India decide what specialties should be formally recognized and how training programmes for these specialties should be organized. Understanding these regulatory functions provides a lens into how policymakers envision the role of these specialties in the broader health system and how they view the linkages between medical education, health system needs and equity. Drawing upon the recent development of emergency medicine in India, the goal of this study was to understand how recognition and training for new medical specialties are regulated in India. Building on previous frameworks, we examined the institutions, functions, enforcement, mechanisms and institutional relationships that make up the regulatory architecture, and situated our analysis in historical context. Two data sources were iteratively utilized: document review (n ¼ 93) and in-depth interviews (n ¼ 87). Our analysis reveals a plurality of institutions involved in regulating recognition and training for new medical specialties in India, characterized by a lack of coordination, limited collaboration and weak accountability. We also found an absence of clear responsibility for the systematic, planned development of specialties, particularly in terms of health system in strengthening and achieving health equity. As medical specialization continues to shape health systems in LMICs, further streamlining and coordination in the regulatory system will enable policymakers, researchers, practitioners and civil society to proactively plan for how these specialties can better integrate with health systems, and to advance their contribution to improving health outcomes.
Introduction
Regulation is an essential governance function in health systems, and is central to advancing equity-oriented policy objectives in health (Busse et al., 2003; Ensor and Weinzierl, 2007; Barbazza and Tello, 2014) . The term regulation encompasses several functions, including those undertaken by government to 'influence the activities of individuals or actors through the manipulation of target variables, such as price, quantity and quality' , or those undertaken by non-state actors, through private regulation, self-regulation or regulatory partnerships (Bloom et al., 2014) . However, evidence from certain low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) suggests serious challenges in regulating the health sector in these contexts. Problems include inadequately designed regulatory frameworks, poor convergence and coordination across regulatory institutions, regulatory capture, weak enforcement of existing regulations and limited organizational capacity to administer regulatory functions (Janovsky and Travis, 2010; Sheikh et al., 2013; Bloom et al., 2014; Doherty, 2015) . Many of these countries also face rapidly evolving health marketsthe regulation of which has tended to lag behind-and deep and pervasive health inequities, making the role of regulation in ensuring the availability of high-quality, affordable and equitable health services all the more important (Bloom et al., 2014) .
The regulation of medical specialization is an emerging, yet underexplored, aspect of health sector governance in LMICs. Key regulatory functions in this regard include determining recognized categories for specialization, the types of practitioners who may acquire skills in certain specializations, the approval or accreditation of specialist training programmes, specialist licencing, registration and re-registration, continuing medical education and ethical considerations (i.e. complaint investigations) (Weisz, 2003) . In many LMICs, statutory professional bodies-institutions authorized by government statute to enable professionals to self-regulate-perform these duties Teerawattananon et al., 2003; Janovsky and Travis, 2010; HEBRG, 2011; World Health Organization, 2014; Doherty, 2015; Clarke et al., 2016; Keshri, 2018) . Differences exist between countries in the legal authority given to these statutory professional bodies, the role of the state in their affairs, their organizational capacities and power dynamics amongst relevant stakeholders (Janovsky and Travis, 2010; World Health Organization, 2014; Doherty, 2015) .
India is an example of a country where medical specialization is increasingly shaping and influencing the health system, particularly in the areas of service delivery and medical education, driven in part by growing privatization of the health sector (Baru, 2003; Zachariah, 2012; Sood, 2015) . Private, tertiary-level, multi-speciality hospitals in urban areas are becoming increasingly common (Baru, 2006) , although the government in recent years has moved actively to expand tertiary care in the public sector (Manjunatha and Chaturvedi, 2012; Patel et al., 2015) . Major challenges continue to exist in the availability and accessibility of specialist services; tertiary care is largely delinked from lower levels of the health care system, the distribution of specialists is heavily skewed to urban areas when compared with rural areas and there is a notable shortage of specialists, particularly in public sector facilities (Rao et al., 2011; Patel et al., 2015) . From a training standpoint, there are over 28 000 postgraduate seats across medical institutions (Ravi et al., 2017) with plans underway to increase the total number of seats (Indian Express, 2017) . However, the distribution of these seats by specialty is imbalanced, particularly when viewed against the disease burden and health system needs (Rao et al., 2011; Ananthakrishnan et al., 2012) .
Within this context, several 'broad specialties' in the Indian context, such as palliative medicine and emergency medicine have recently emerged (Table 1) . Uniquely, India has two formal pathways for regulating the recognition and training for new medical specialties: the Medical Council of India (MCI)-a statutory professional council that by Act of Parliament oversees medical colleges (Sood, 2008; Medical Council of India, 2016) -and the National Board of Examinations (NBE)-an autonomous body under the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW). Beyond these two pathways, the Institutes of National Importance, including the All India Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS), may also independently offer courses in new medical specialties. MCI currently recognizes approximately 40 'broad' specialties (specialties requiring postgraduate training following undergraduate medical education), in addition to numerous 'super-specialties' (specialties that require an additional postgraduate degree beyond training in a broad specialty) (Medical Council of India, 2000b) . Of the six recent broad specialties, at least two have reportedly experienced difficulties in seeking recognition and establishing training programmes with MCI (David et al., 2007; Rajagopal, 2015) . Table 1 indicates that decision-making on recognition is seemingly ad hoc, as seen in the shift of infectious disease from broad to super-specialty, and imbalances can be observed in the distribution of postgraduate seats across these new specialties. However, almost no research has been done on how and why these specialties face these particular challenges within the regulatory architecture in gaining recognition and establishing training programmes.
As medical specialization continues to shape and influence health systems in India and other LMICs, more needs to be understood about how regulatory institutions in these countries decide what specialties should be officially recognized, and how training programmes for these specialties are organized. There are several reasons why understanding these regulatory functions is important. First, understanding how and why new medical specialties are formally recognized provides insight into how regulatory stakeholders envisage the role of these specialties in the broader health system; in other words, what does the recognition of new medical specialties tell us about national priorities in health? Specifically, how do issues of societal need and equity weigh against broader market forces, technological advancement and innovation? Second, understanding how regulatory institutions that regulate recognition and training for new medical specialties is a lens into how policymakers view the linkages between medical education and health systems issues (Frenk et al., 2010; Sheikh et al., 2017) . For example, how do regulators, educators and other stakeholders perceive the role of these specialties vis-à -vis other services in the health system, and how are these considerations reflected in training policy, such as curriculum, faculty criteria and infrastructure requirements? Third, the regulation of medical specialties has been historically seen as a medicocentric issue (Weisz, 2003) , and therefore, analysing the regulation of recognition and training allows us to understand the extent to which the medical establishment controls such processes, and to examine if and how non-medical stakeholders play a role.
Understanding the regulatory functions related to recognition and training for new medical specialties also allows us to shed light on health sector regulation more broadly in India. Few empirical studies have explored health sector regulation in India, and fewer still have examined the institutions that are critical actors in regulating the health workforce, including professional councils (Bhat, 1996; Peters and Muraleedharan, 2008; Baru, 2013; Sheikh et al., 2013) . The existing empirical literature on these councils and their relationships with other stakeholders in the regulatory system highlight weak institutions, bureaucratic inefficiencies and the accumulation of political power (Maru, 1985; Jeffrey, 1988; Bhat, 1996; Iyer and Jessani, 1999; Sheikh et al., 2012) . The development of the role and function of MCI has been particularly problematic and complicated. In the 1990s and 2000s, several media reports, and a few studies, explored the growing institutional and ethical crisis within MCI, particularly with regards to the rapid diffusion and poor regulation of private medical education (Bhat, 1996; Iyer and Jessani, 1999; Rajalakshmi, 2001; Press Trust of India, 2010) . By 2016, the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare issued a comprehensive, and highly critical, report of the functioning of MCI (Parliament of India, 2016) . Some in the Indian medical community have advocated for a fundamental restructuring of medical education (Pandya, 1995; Ananthakrishnan, 2010; Sood and Ananthakrishnan, 2012; Thomas, 2013; Nagral et al., 2016) . Reform initiatives have recently gained momentum (Parliament of India, 2018) and further empirical work on these professional councils can contribute to these efforts (Ravi et al., 2017) .
Drawing upon a case study of the recent evolution of emergency medicine in India, we seek to understand how recognition and training for new medical specialties are regulated in India. Emergency medicine serves as a useful example for understanding these various regulatory functions. Postgraduate courses in emergency medicine have been instituted in medical colleges and institutions associated with MCI and NBE, and have also begun in some Institutes of National Importance. Particularly in the case of MCI, emergency medicine stakeholders faced hurdles in seeking recognition; developing and disseminating a curriculum in medical colleges; securing recognition for courses in medical colleges and clarifying ambiguous training policy guidelines. For these reasons, examining the regulatory architecture through this case may provide critical insights. We also intend that this analysis is a lens into the linkages between the governance processes for specialty development and their impact on the broader health system. Our objectives with this study are specifically to:
1. Map the regulatory architecture for recognition and training for new medical specialties; 2. Examine the functioning of the regulatory architecture in practice; and 3. Situate our analysis in the broader historical context of health sector regulation in India.
Conceptual framework
Our examination of the regulatory architecture was driven by a framework developed by Kumaranayake et al. (2000) , who consider three main aspects of regulation: what to regulate, who to regulate and how to regulate. Supplementing Kumaranayake et al. (2000) with research from Sheikh et al. (2013) , we developed a framework consisting of five dimensions, anchored by regulatory functions, and then further divided according to institutions, mechanisms, enforcement and institutional relationships (Table 2) . This exercise was initially designed as a mapping of the regulatory architecture for recognition and training for new medical specialties. However, in the course of conducting this analysis, it was increasingly clear that a straightforward mapping did not illustrate the disparity that we observed between the formal rules, regulations and processes, and the actual processes taking place according to stakeholders. Our data collection therefore also included an exploration into how the regulatory architecture actually functioned in practice. In this way, our study resonates with the 'hardware-software' framework that has been applied to research on health sector governance (Abimbola et al., 2017) . In this framework, hardware refers to organizational structures, legislation and formal rules and regulations by which health policies are made and implemented, and software refers to the underlying ideas, interests, values, norms, power relations and informal rules that undergird these processes (Sheikh et al., 2011; Abimbola et al., 2017) . Such an approach takes a descriptive, non-normative approach, providing critical insight on the gaps between formal and informal rules, the latter playing a central role in governance in many LMICs (Barbazza and Tello, 2014; Abimbola et al., 2017) .
Methods
Two data sources were iteratively utilized: a detailed review of documents and a series of in-depth interviews. The analysis presented here was part of a doctoral dissertation focused on the recent development of emergency medicine as a medical specialty in India.
Document Review: The purpose of the document review was to provide evidence of both formal regulatory structures and processes pertaining to recognition and training for new medical specialties, and to uncover written evidence on how processes actually took place in the case of emergency medicine. For this analysis, 93 documents were selected (examples in Box 1). Documents were obtained through desk review and snowball sampling. We analysed the documents based on their relevance to the categories of the framework and entered relevant summarized information into a case study database. Interviews: Interviews provided an opportunity to understand various components of the regulatory architecture, but more importantly, to explore how these components functioned in practice. A semistructured interview guide was developed, based on a preliminary mapping of the regulatory architecture from a priori knowledge and a brief document review (Bernard, 2006) . Box 2 provides examples of the types of questions. We selected potential respondents through two forms of purposive sampling: maximum variation sampling-a form of sampling used to capture shared experiences and common patterns across a diverse stakeholder group with different interests and ideas (e.g. regulators, government officials, emergency medicine stakeholders and medical college leadership)-and snowball sampling (Patton, 1990) . Data collection took place between March 2015 and March 2016, with the majority of interviews taking place in-person in India. All interviews were conducted by the first author. Potential respondents were contacted by phone, email and/or in-person. A total of 87 interviews with 76 respondents were conducted, 72 of which took place in-person, 8 by Skype and 7 by phone. Interviews ranged between 30 min and 2 h, and were conducted in English (with intermittent use of Hindi or Tamil). Verbal consent was obtained from all respondents, and interviews were audio-recorded wherever possible. During each interview, extensive notes were taken by hand, and were summarized in the form of memos.
Audio-recorded interviews were transcribed verbatim by a contracted transcriber. Each respondent was assigned a code during analysis, and we have withheld organizational affiliation and other identifying information in order to protect their identities (Table 3) . Analysis: The first stage of the analysis was to construct a matrix that consisted of five categories of the framework (Miles et al., 2014) . We then reviewed interview memos in order to familiarize ourselves with the data (Charmaz, 2006) . We proceeded to coding, Box 2. Categories and examples of questioning during in-depth interviews Recognition of emergency medicine as a medical specialty • Could you recollect when you first heard about efforts to introduce emergency medicine as an academic specialty in India?
• Formally, what was the process to decide whether to recognize a specialty within the institution (MCI/NBE/INIs)?
• What were typically some of the parameters by which the institution would decide whether to include a specialty or not? • In practice, what was the process for deciding whether to recognize emergency medicine as a specialty within the institution? • Specific to MCI:
• What was the role of the Postgraduate Committee?
• What was the role of Executive Committee?
• Did these committees interact? If so, how?
• What were some of the discussions that took place around emergency medicine in 2000, 2004 and 2007 (when emergency medicine appears in the MCI meeting minutes)?
• What were some of the reasons for the formal recognition of emergency medicine within the institution?
Initiating training programmes for emergency medicine • How was teaching eligibility criteria decided for emergency medicine?
• How was the emergency medicine curriculum developed?
• In the context of MCI, what is the distinction between prescribing and advising?
• In the context of medical colleges, do all specialties typically have an approved curriculum? Are colleges mandated to follow this?
• How are minimum standard or infrastructure requirements developed?
• How does the institution enforce these policies? How do medical colleges experience these enforcement procedures?
• In the context of MCI, what influence did states have on specialty recognition at this time?
• MCI had apparently recognized Accident and Emergency Medicine in the 1970s, after which it was dropped in 2000.
Could you suggest reasons for why this happened? adopting a combined inductive and deductive approach (Gale, 2013) , and developed an initial list of codes based on the interview guides, conceptual framework, memos, observations and select documents. We then conducted line-by-line coding on six transcripts, from which we further inductively generated codes (Charmaz, 2006 ). The new codebook was then applied to an additional eight transcripts, following which we prepared a final codebook. We applied this codebook to an additional 32 transcripts that were selected for in-depth coding due to the richness of the data presented in those interviews. We populated the matrix using data extracted from our coding and materials from the document review. We reviewed the data within the matrix, wrote up findings on each category and, where relevant, developed themes. We then reviewed the remaining 41 interviews to confirm or disconfirm our findings and presented new information wherever possible. Next, we developed the historical context through an in-depth analysis of the interview data and document review. Finally, we shared written findings with two respondents with expertise on the regulation of postgraduate medical education in India for respondent validation and incorporated feedback where possible.
Results
First, we describe the historical context for the recognition and training for new medical specialties in India. Then, we provide findings on each of the categories in our conceptual framework.
Historical context
In India, public health and health facility administration are considered the responsibility of state governments (Constitution of India, 1950). However, medical education and the medical profession have been placed on the concurrent list, giving both the centre and the state power to legislate on these subjects (with the centre taking precedence over the state) (Constitution of India, 1950). Despite being a concurrent responsibility, the regulation of professional education related to health has evolved towards being the responsibility of the centre, through legally sanctioned professional councils, such as MCI. Although accountable to MoHFW, some respondents noted that the councils function with a high degree of autonomy.
The overall process for recognizing new medical specialties and for initiating training programmes in India emerged in a largely ad hoc manner. The Mudaliar Committee in 1962 cautioned that the system of regulating postgraduate medical education through MCI was inadequate, and proposed the formation of an independent Postgraduate Council, a recommendation similar to that of the Bhore Committee 16 years earlier (Bhore Committee, 1946; Mudaliar Committee, 1962) . However, this recommendation was not implemented. The number of institutions involved in these functions expanded in the decades post-independence with the establishment of the AIIMS in New Delhi and the Institutes of Postgraduate Medical Education and Research in Chandigarh and Puducherry. These institutions were established to ensure India's self-sufficiency and ability to meet global standards in medical education, and in particular postgraduate education (Jeffrey, 1988) , and were also legally allowed to operate somewhat autonomously. Adding to the plurality of institutions was the establishment of the NBE by the Government of India in 1975, a parallel postgraduate regulatory institution meant to provide a 'prestigious' mechanism for postgraduate medical education, in line with the British Royal College and American Board systems (Economic and Political Weekly, 1975) .
The relationship between the MCI and NBE quickly became antagonistic, and the two institutions repeatedly and volubly came into conflict, particularly around the legal equivalence of their respective degrees (Parliament of India, 2016). Therefore, multiple institutions became engaged in specialty recognition and regulation, without policy guidelines or coordination mechanisms bringing these threads together.
With the acceleration of privatization in medical education in the 1980s and 1990s, the Indian Medical Council Act was amended to include Section 10A in 1993 (Government of India, 1956) , in order to stop the reportedly unstructured growth of medical colleges, and to facilitate standardization of training programmes. Section 10A gave central-level authorities, specifically MCI and MoHFW, more direct oversight of medical education by requiring medical colleges to adhere to certain criteria and undergo inspection by MCI before postgraduate training programmes were formally given permission (Parliament of India, 2016). The 1990s and 2000s also saw the concentration of financial, political and bureaucratic power by MCI alongside growing scrutiny of reportedly illegal activities by its leaders (MacAskill et al., 2015; Parliament of India, 2016; Ravi et al., 2017) . In parallel, institutions such as NBE acquired a relatively positive reputation, with fewer allegations of corruption (Parliament of India, 2016). Table 4 provides an overview of the institutions, mechanisms, enforcement options and institutional relationships available for the regulatory functions involved in recognizing specialties, developing training policy and initiating training programmes. In practice, the MoHFW has authority and oversight over MCI, NBE and the Institutes of National Importance; however, we were unable to locate any particular policy guidance issued by the Ministry regarding the processes for specialty recognition itself. Further, while respondents acknowledged the broader role of MoHFW in the regulation of medical education, some former central government respondents and former regulators noted that MoHFW did not see the recognition of new medical specialties as an issue of significant political priority (CG1, CG2, MC3, RI2, RI5).
Components of the regulatory architecture

Institutions
I think that postgraduate medical education, by and large, has not been interfered with by the Ministry because it is too small an issue for them (private sector medical college stakeholder/former regulator).
For this reason, mechanisms had reportedly not been developed within MoHFW to address the issue of specialty recognition, nor does MoHFW seem to have any particular influence on the topic with MCI.
I have never come across a case where government have appointed another expert committee to see whether a course in nuclear medicine is really important or not or whether an MD in emergency medicine should be introduced or not. I don't think Government of India has ever questioned that (former central government official).
Functions and mechanisms
Several regulatory functions are involved in recognition and training for new medical specialties. The first is the formal recognition of medical specialties, particularly in the context of MCI. The next function is development of requirements to start a training programme in that specialty, such as curriculum, faculty criteria and infrastructure requirements. Finally, regulatory institutions must approve the initiation of training programmes in the specialty in medical institutions. The mechanisms for undertaking these functions, drawing upon the experience of emergency medicine, are described below.
Formal recognition of specialties
The Indian Medical Council Act empowers MCI to make regulations and prescribe standards regarding postgraduate medical education, with the approval of the central government. The Postgraduate Medical Education Regulations further indicate that MCI may decide on the 'nomenclature' of postgraduate courses, or in other words, make decisions on the inclusion of new specialties. One regulator noted that in making these decisions, MCI looks at 'the need, the mandate and the requirements'. We could not, however, locate written procedures or processes for making these decisions. Respondents noted that specialties often emerged in an ad hoc manner [RI4, MC3, MC4, RI8, CG2, RI9].
Unfortunately, it's not a very thought through, established procedure. It's kind of an ad hoc, as and when, kind of a situation. Which is an offshoot of the fact I think that the overall regulation of medical education is I would say weak, structure is very weak (former regulator).
Respondents involved in the regulatory system noted that the Postgraduate Committee was responsible for handling requests for new specialties, but provided differing accounts regarding the role of the Executive Committee in these discussions (RI3, RI5, RI7, RI8, RI11). These respondents agreed that once the relevant committees had given their approval, the decision must then be approved by the General Body of MCI and MoHFW, and then finally published in the Gazette of India as a formal notification.
NBE independently initiates specialties through a process involving its Board and administrative branch. While the Executive Director can advocate strongly for the inclusion of a specialty, the Board takes the final decision and MoHFW must also provide final approval.
In the case of emergency medicine, regulatory respondents noted that demand from medical colleges with resources to start programmes was a key driver in initiating the specialty [RI2, RI8, RI11]. In addition to interest from medical college leadership, some respondents also noted the possible influence of the growing demand from medical students for emergency medicine training during this time period, driven by prospects for employment with for-profit hospitals, and employment opportunities in emergency medicine in high-income settings [EM1, EM2, MC2, INI2]. Regulatory institution respondents noted that the presence of emergency medicine in high-income countries, and its potential applicability to India, factored into decision-making [RI7, RI8]. These respondents also discussed the presence of private sector, 'unrecognized' emergency medicine programmes and perceived increases in the burden of road traffic crashes as other factors driving the recognition of the specialty [RI7, RI8, RI11].
Respondents reported a lengthy process for specialty recognition at both MCI and NBE [RI2, RI6, RI7, MC3] The regulatory role is so overwhelming [MCI] , that it has not time for anything innovative by way of starting new courses or anything . . . unless they separate the regulatory and the innovative aspects it will never improve because the work is too much on one side (private medical college stakeholder/former regulator).
Similarly, NBE announced plans to launch the programme in 2007-2008, but the decision was delayed until 2013, reportedly due to disagreements and delays within the Board [R2, R6].
Developing training policy and initiating training programmes
Once a specialty is formally approved, MCI determines the eligibility criteria for teaching faculty, and the minimum standard requirements (MSR) for a college to start a training programme. Faculty criteria are usually worked out alongside the formal recognition of the specialty, as was the case with emergency medicine (Medical Council of India, 2009a) . The MSR is developed after a specialty is recognized, as the requirements drive formal MCI inspections processes. In the case of emergency medicine, the processes to develop faculty criteria and MSR were reportedly internal to MCI, and many emergency medicine stakeholders were dissatisfied with the clarity of the resulting policies. For example, MCI did not adequately qualify the phrase '2 years training in emergency medicine' in the faculty criteria policy. Respondents also noted that the MSRs were based on a 'one size fits all' policy from the Postgraduate Regulations, and were not reflective of organizational and infrastructure requirements as perceived by emergency medicine stakeholders [EM2, EM4, EM5, EM7, INI1, INI6]. For example, the emergency medicine MSR for 2016-2017 requires emergency medicine departments to distinguish between in-patient beds, out-patient beds and 'casualty' beds (Medical Council of India, 2015) . In the view of emergency medicine stakeholders, separating hospital beds in this manner is at odds with the transitory nature of emergency departments.
MCI regulations state the institution should play an advisory role in curriculum development, and that colleges must establish committees to coordinate curriculum development (Medical Council of India, 2000b) . In practice, some respondents indicated that while MCI has an important role in developing curricula, it played this role inconsistently in the case of emergency medicine [INI1, INI2, INI6, EM5, EM8]. For example, the emergency medicine curriculum put together in 2011 was yet to be disseminated in 2015, despite several postgraduate programmes in emergency medicine running at the time. Curriculum development seems to occur with little coordination across specialties and institutions; in February 2012, the MCI Board of Governors noted that curricula for critical care medicine and emergency medicine had areas of overlap, and that MCI and NBE should develop a standardized national curriculum (Medical Council of India, 2012) .
Some respondents discussed the simultaneous and systematic development of curriculum, infrastructure and assessments in the NBE system. Prior to its formal recognition in 2013, NBE established an advisory committee for emergency medicine consisting of Indian and international stakeholders to guide programme development, and this committee reported being actively involved in its strategy and design. In 2014, 20 institutions began offering the DNB in emergency medicine with a capacity of 66 seats, which was scaled to 248 seats in 50 institutions by 2017 (Jain et al., 2014; Nagarajan, 2017) . However, these processes were not without challenges. Two respondents noted that in the case of emergency medicine, many programmes were not initiated due to a period of inactivity with the NBE Board in 2014 and 2015 (MC1, RI5) . Further, the composition of the advisory committee became contested in 2015, with rival emergency medicine professional associations competing for influence on the committee.
There is no separate process to recognize a specialty at Institutes of National Importance; these institutes go through internal processes to start new programmes, and to develop curricula, faculty criteria and infrastructure requirements, as was observed in the case of emergency medicine at two Institutes [RI6, RI8, INI1, INI2, INI3] .
MCI may also recognize postgraduate training courses offered by non-academic institutions in a specialty through the Third Schedule of the Indian Medical Council Act. For example, the College of Physicians and Surgeons, Bombay, offers diplomas and fellowships in several specialties. In the case of emergency medicine, several 'unrecognized' courses were established from the 1990s onwards; however, as of 2015, none of these courses were approved as per the Third Schedule. The Executive Committee has, however, granted registration for individuals who have passed the Member of the Royal College of Emergency Medicine (U.K.) entrance examination [EM9]. Emergency medicine respondents noted there had been an understanding in the stakeholder network that 'unrecognized' programmes could exist outside of the regulatory system [MC2, EM1, EM2]. However, the legality of such programmes has been increasingly questioned in recent years by regulators and some emergency medicine stakeholders, with MCI taking a punitive stance against certain courses (Nagarajan, 2017) .
Enforcement
Medical colleges seeking to establish a postgraduate training programme in the MCI system must undergo an 'unannounced' inspection. Specialists from public medical colleges, including the Institutes of National Importance, conduct these inspections. Inspectors utilize a form known as the Standard Assessment Form, based on the MSRs, and are required to enter information related to both the medical college and the programme that is being inspected. Private medical colleges are also required to pay an inspection fee and show an adequate bank balance, with some exceptions (Medical Council of India, 2000a) . Inspectors cannot make a judgment on whether a programme should be approved or rejected. Their role is to share their assessment with the Postgraduate Committee of MCI, following which the Committee makes a decision on whether to recommend the programme for permission (first stage) or recognition (second stage) to MoHFW.
The NBE system also relies upon specialty stakeholders to conduct inspections for new programmes. Two respondents noted that enforcement in the NBE system appears to follow a structured and blinded format, including standardized curricula and exams across all NBE programmes in a particular field, and yearly appraisals of the programme. Respondents involved in the enforcement process in Institutes of National Importance noted that the systems of enforcement in the colleges are tightly monitored internally.
In the case of emergency medicine, the system of enforcements in the MCI context was highly contentious. Respondents from regulatory institutions, inspectors and medical colleges held vastly different interpretations regarding the MSR and training policy, and these differences led to MCI withholding recognition from 11 colleges, with reasons ranging from ineligible faculty to inadequate clinical teaching material (Postgraduate Committee Meeting Minutes 2014 . Emergency medicine training program managers felt that their programmes were being unfairly penalized due to the lack of policy guidance from MCI.
In practice, the thing is MCI haven't actually given proper guidelines. Now suppose they have laid out 12345, these are the things that you need to run the course or to get recognized, every medical college would follow it, but they have not done that (private medical college stakeholder).
Institutional relationships
Several respondents from the regulatory institutions and medical colleges noted poor coordination between the institutions, specifically in regards to recognition of new medical specialties, including emergency medicine [RI2, RI3, MC2, RI4, RI8, DP1] . A consequence of these weak institutional arrangements was the lack of a policy framework linking specialty development and health systems strengthening [RI4, RI8]. Further, these unclear institutional arrangements negatively impacted the growth of emergency medicine. For example, respondents held different opinions regarding which group should be responsible for raising awareness about emergency medicine training programmes among medical colleges. Regulators felt that this should be the responsibility of the professional societies, and state and central governments [RI7, RI10], while emergency medicine stakeholders felt that MCI needed to play a more active role [EM1, EM3] .
Respondents also noted that there was an implicit hierarchy in the regulatory institutions, even if such hierarchy was not expressed in any formal policies. Regulatory, government and emergency medicine respondents commented on the hostile and unequal relationship between MCI and NBE in particular.
NBE feels [it] is a little brother, and MCI feels that you are little (private sector medical college stakeholder).
The implicit hierarchy and conflicted relationship between the MCI and NBE also contributed to confusion around key issues. For example, some emergency medicine respondents noted that NBE cannot start a specialty until MCI has done so; however, regulators indicated that this was inaccurate and there were no official policy guidelines stating as such. Some emergency medicine respondents from medical colleges were also resistant to starting DNB programmes in emergency medicine for fear of punitive action by MCI; other emergency medicine respondents noted that this was inaccurate, and one medical college had even started a DNB programme in emergency medicine.
However, MCI and the Institutes of National Importance, particularly AIIMS, have a more cordial relationship [INI1, INI3] . The two institutions work in close 'harmony' on certain processes; e.g. AIIMS faculty served on the emergency medicine curriculum committee, and also served as inspectors for training programme accreditation [INI1, INI2, INI4, RI7].
Discussion
Our study provides some of the first empirical evidence on the regulation of new medical specialties in LMICs, specifically in the context of recognition and training. Our findings on the plurality of institutions, lack of coordination, weak systems of participation and consensus building and inadequate mechanisms for accountability resonate with other studies of health sector regulation in India (Bhat, 1996; Peters and Muraleedharan, 2008; Baru, 2013; Sheikh et al., 2013) .
Our analysis suggests that the basis for fragmentation in this regulatory architecture lies in the path-dependent nature of its overall evolution, i.e. the evolution of institutions based on historical, political and socioeconomic factors that are challenging to reverse or replicate (Bloom et al., 2014) . In this case, despite recommendations by high-level government committees from 1946 onwards, clear policies and a coordinated approach to postgraduate medical education appears to be a low priority for policymakers, resulting in largely independent 'sub-systems'-MCI, NBE and the Institutes of National Importance. Due to multiple policy trajectories for regulating the recognition and training for new medical specialties, the regulatory architecture has become rife with confusion for stakeholders, a perception supported by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Health and Family Welfare, which states forcefully that the fragmented system of postgraduate medical education in India is deeply flawed (Parliament of India, 2016).
From a 'hardware' standpoint, the plurality of institutions, without adequate mechanisms for convergence and coordination, has resulted in role confusion, fragmentation of authority and conflicted institutional relationships. We posit that this role confusion has created a vacuum of responsibility in the overarching systematic planning, coordination and implementation of specialty development, particularly in the context of equity and health systems strengthening. Ideally, regulatory frameworks should ensure that the health sector operates in a way that, at a minimum, does not undermine social objectives (Busse et al., 2003; Doherty, 2015) . As our case demonstrates, ad hoc policy processes have emerged in the regulatory architecture, effectively delinking the growth of specialties from the broader health system and considerations of equity. For example, MoHFW is meant to be the institution that steers the health sector towards achieving its goals of health equity, and yet, they are not substantially and/or meaningfully involved in any decision-making around the recognition of specialties. Further, without necessary incentives, the growth of postgraduate training programmes in private medical colleges might significantly outpace that of public medical colleges, as observed in this case. As noted by Zachariah (2014) , the lack of emphasis on equity in the development of medical specialties in India enables specialties catering to the urban elite to flourish, resulting in a form of 'structural discrimination that is as invisible as it is pervasive'. Further, from a 'software' perspective, the conflicted institutional relationships brought on by the lack of coordination and convergence has meant that there are several missed opportunities, such as standardizing curriculum and developing strategies to better link medical education, health systems and equity. Future reform efforts may consider appropriate mechanisms for convergence, coordination and accountability across the regulatory system, including deliberate approaches to ensuring that the regulation of recognition and training for new medical specialties is viewed from an equity lens.
A key governance dimension is the importance of participation and consensus building across stakeholder groups (Barbazza and Tello, 2014) . Our case highlights both the highly centralized nature of decision-making within the regulatory institutions, and the political nature of involving external experts. Further, at the time of the study, few efforts had been taken to reflect on the perspectives of medical colleges, and to generate consensus across regulatory institutions, on policies such as faculty criteria, curriculum, and infrastructure requirements for emergency medicine. The NBE system allowed for a more expanded advisory committee in the development of its curriculum and training programme requirements, but even that system could do more to engage relevant stakeholders who are not considered experts, but are close to patient care, such as residents, casualty medical officers, nurses and other frontline staff. Allowing training policy to evolve in this manner might exacerbate the existing domination of elite, medico-centric views of health, and divorced from the needs of population health (Sood and Ananthakrishnan, 2012) .
Finally, our analysis highlights an underlying issue of weak accountability in this regulatory architecture. From a normative standpoint, governance involves the transfer of decision-making responsibility from individuals to a governing entity, with accountability mechanisms necessary to ensure the efficient and ethical conduct of processes (Fryatt et al., 2017) . Central to the concept of accountability is answerability, responsiveness and trust (Brinkerhoff, 2004) . Our analysis suggests limited accountability at multiple levels-amongst MoHFW and the institutions that it oversees; between MCI and the medical colleges; and most notably, between the public and these institutions, a finding that resonates with other analyses of the regulatory system (Parliament of India, 2016). Formal accountability mechanisms, such as stakeholder committees and assemblies, two-way communication channels, and rapid, transparent documentation of decision-making processes, may be instituted, in addition to concerted efforts within these institutions to improve internal norms and 'self-policing' (Topp et al., 2015) .
This study has a number of limitations. First, our analysis was focused on a single case of the development of emergency medicine, therefore limiting its generalizability to other broad and superspecialties in India. Similar in-depth research is required on the trajectories of these fields in order to broaden and deepen our understanding of these regulatory processes. Cross-case comparisons will also be particularly helpful in drawing out similarities and differences within broad specialties, and between broad and superspecialties. Second, some respondents did not fully recollect or reveal certain aspects of the regulatory processes. We attempted to address this issue by triangulating our data sources, and by incorporating the perspectives of a range of stakeholders. Finally, our study is largely focused on events up until December 2015; recent important developments in medical education, such as the initiation of the Supreme Court oversight committee and possible reform of the medical education system through the proposed National Medical Commission, could not be covered in this paper (Press Trust of India, 2017; Parliament of India, 2018).
Conclusion
The regulation of recognition and training for new medical specialties in India and other LMICs has received limited attention in the literature. Our findings provide some of the first empirical evidence on this topic, suggesting that several key governance issues-institutional plurality, lack of convergence and coordination, limited collaboration and weak accountability-are contributing to a scenario in which decision-making around introducing medical specialization is largely delinked from considerations of health systems strengthening and health equity. As medical specialization continues to influence and shape health systems in LMICs, it is important that policymakers, researchers, practitioners and civil society begin to proactively plan for how these fields can be better integrated into health systems, and to ensure their equitable contribution to improving health outcomes.
